Goddard College.
Am Psychol. 2015 Sep;70(6):570-1. doi: 10.1037/a0039189.
Comments on the original article "Life is pretty meaningful," by S. J. Heintzelman and L. A. King (see record 2014-03265-001). Heintzelman and King explored meaning in life (MIL), which they acknowledged "remains, in some ways, a construct and experience shrouded in mystery" (p. 561). Unfortunately, they dealt with this complex topic in a very simplistic way. They claimed that "from an existentialist perspective, human life has no inherent meaning" (p. 568), but this is not true for all existentialists. They then implied that their data had somehow refuted this existentialist view, proving it false. In fact, nothing of the sort has been proven, as only a distorted straw existentialist position has been challenged by data of questionable worth for this task, and used to draw the trite conclusion that life is pretty meaningful-and the implication that existentialists must be wrong. This oversimplicity does great injustice not only to the many nuanced existentialist positions but also to the mystery of MIL.
对 S. J. 海因策尔曼和 L. A. 金（参见记录 2014-03265-001）的原始文章“生活是非常有意义的”的评论。海因策尔曼和金探讨了生命的意义（MIL），他们承认“在某种程度上，这仍然是一个充满神秘色彩的建构和体验”（第 561 页）。不幸的是，他们以一种非常简单的方式处理了这个复杂的主题。他们声称“从存在主义的角度来看，人类的生活没有内在的意义”（第 568 页），但并非所有存在主义者都如此认为。然后，他们暗示他们的数据以某种方式反驳了这种存在主义观点，证明它是错误的。事实上，根本没有证明这一点，因为只有一个扭曲的、稻草人般的存在主义立场受到了有问题的数据的挑战，这些数据被用来得出平淡无奇的结论，即生活是非常有意义的，并且暗示存在主义者一定是错的。这种过于简单化不仅对许多微妙的存在主义立场极不公平，而且对 MIL 的神秘性也极不公平。
