Trouche Emmanuel, Johansson Petter, Hall Lars, Mercier Hugo
CNRS, Laboratory for Language, Brain and Cognition.
Cognitive Science, Lund University.
Cogn Sci. 2016 Nov;40(8):2122-2136. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12303. Epub 2015 Oct 9.
Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this "selective laziness," we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was someone else's. Among those participants who accepted the manipulation and thus thought they were evaluating someone else's argument, more than half (56% and 58%) rejected the arguments that were in fact their own. Moreover, participants were more likely to reject their own arguments for invalid than for valid answers. This demonstrates that people are more critical of other people's arguments than of their own, without being overly critical: They are better able to tell valid from invalid arguments when the arguments are someone else's rather than their own.
推理研究表明，人们在评估他人的论点时比自己提出论点时使用更严格的标准。为了证明这种“选择性懒惰”，我们采用了选择盲视操作。在两项实验中，参与者必须针对推理问题提出一系列论点，然后要求他们评估其他人针对相同问题的论点。参与者不知道的是，在其中一次试验中，他们自己提出的论点被呈现给他们，就好像是别人的一样。在那些接受了这种操作并因此认为自己在评估别人论点的参与者中，超过一半（分别为56%和58%）拒绝了实际上是他们自己的论点。此外，参与者更有可能因为答案无效而拒绝自己的论点，而不是因为答案有效。这表明人们对别人的论点比自己的论点更挑剔，但又不会过于挑剔：当论点是别人的而不是自己的时，他们更能区分有效和无效的论点。
