Surtees Andrew, Samson Dana, Apperly Ian
University catholique de Louvain, Belgium; University of Birmingham, UK.
University catholique de Louvain, Belgium.
Cognition. 2016 Mar;148:97-105. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.12.010. Epub 2016 Jan 2.
A long established distinction exists in developmental psychology between young children's ability to judge whether objects are seen by another, known as "level-1" perspective-taking, and judging how the other sees those objects, known as "level-2" perspective-taking (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981a; Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Wilcox, 1981b). Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Bodley Scott (2010) provided evidence that there are two routes available to adults for level-1 perspective-taking: one which is triggered relatively automatically and the other requiring cognitive control. We tested whether both these routes were available for adults' level-2 perspective-taking. Explicit judgements of both level-1 and level-2 perspectives were subject to egocentric interference, suggesting a need for cognitive control. Evidence of unintentional perspective-taking was limited to level-1 judgements.
在发展心理学中，幼儿判断物体是否被他人看到的能力（即“一级”观点采择）与判断他人如何看待这些物体的能力（即“二级”观点采择）之间，长期以来存在着明显的区别（弗拉维尔、埃弗雷特、克罗夫特和弗拉维尔，1981年a；弗拉维尔、弗拉维尔、格林和威尔科克斯，1981年b）。桑普森、阿珀利、布雷思韦特、安德鲁斯和博德利·斯科特（2010年）提供了证据，表明成年人在进行一级观点采择时有两条途径：一条相对自动触发，另一条需要认知控制。我们测试了这两条途径是否都适用于成年人的二级观点采择。一级和二级观点的明确判断都受到自我中心干扰的影响，这表明需要认知控制。无意观点采择的证据仅限于一级判断。
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