Archer Alfred
Bioethics. 2016 Sep;30(7):500-10. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12251. Epub 2016 Feb 1.
Opponents to genetic or biomedical human enhancement often claim that the availability of these technologies would have negative consequences for those who either choose not to utilize these resources or lack access to them. However, Thomas Douglas has argued that this objection has no force against the use of technologies that aim to bring about morally desirable character traits, as the unenhanced would benefit from being surrounded by such people. I will argue that things are not as straightforward as Douglas makes out. The widespread use of moral enhancement would raise the standards for praise and blame worthiness, making it much harder for the unenhanced to perform praiseworthy actions or avoid performing blameworthy actions. This shows that supporters of moral enhancement cannot avoid this challenge in the way that Douglas suggests.
反对基因或生物医学人类增强的人常常声称,这些技术的可获得性会给那些要么选择不使用这些资源,要么无法获得这些资源的人带来负面后果。然而,托马斯·道格拉斯认为,这种反对意见对于旨在培养道德上令人向往的性格特征的技术的使用没有说服力,因为未得到增强的人会从被这样的人所包围中受益。我将论证,事情并非如道格拉斯所描述的那样简单。道德增强的广泛使用会提高值得赞扬和应受责备的标准,使得未得到增强的人更难做出值得赞扬的行为或避免做出应受责备的行为。这表明,道德增强的支持者无法以道格拉斯所建议的方式回避这一挑战。