Tsiachristas Apostolos, Dikkers Carolien, Boland Melinde R S, Rutten-van Mölken Maureen P M H
Health Economics Research Centre, Nuffield Department of Population Health, University of Oxford, United Kingdom; Department of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Erasmus Medical Centre, The Netherlands.
Health Policy. 2016 Apr;120(4):420-30. doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.02.012. Epub 2016 Mar 2.
Various types of financial agreements have been implemented in Europe to reduce health care expenditure by stimulating integrated chronic care. This study used difference-in-differences (DID) models to estimate differences in health care expenditure trends before and after the introduction of a financial agreement between 9 intervention countries and 16 control countries. Intervention countries included countries with pay-for-coordination (PFC), pay-for-performance (PFP), and/or all inclusive agreements (bundled and global payment) for integrated chronic care. OECD and WHO data from 1996 to 2013 was used. The results from the main DID models showed that the annual growth of outpatient expenditure was decreased in countries with PFC (by 21.28 US$ per capita) and in countries with all-inclusive agreements (by 216.60 US$ per capita). The growth of hospital and administrative expenditure was decreased in countries with PFP by 64.50 US$ per capita and 5.74 US$ per capita, respectively. When modelling impact as a non-linear function of time during the total 4-year period after implementation, PFP decreased the growth of hospital and administrative expenditure and all-inclusive agreements reduced the growth of outpatient expenditure. Financial agreements are potentially powerful tools to stimulate integrated care and influence health care expenditure growth. A blended payment scheme that combines elements of PFC, PFP, and all-inclusive payments is likely to provide the strongest financial incentives to control health care expenditure growth.
欧洲已实施了各类财务协议,以通过促进综合慢性病护理来降低医疗保健支出。本研究使用双重差分(DID)模型来估计9个干预国家和16个对照国家在引入财务协议前后医疗保健支出趋势的差异。干预国家包括对综合慢性病护理采用按协调付费(PFC)、按绩效付费(PFP)和/或全包协议(捆绑式和全球支付)的国家。使用了经合组织(OECD)和世界卫生组织(WHO)1996年至2013年的数据。主要DID模型的结果显示,采用PFC的国家门诊支出的年增长率下降(人均减少21.28美元),采用全包协议的国家门诊支出的年增长率下降(人均减少216.60美元)。采用PFP的国家医院支出和行政支出的增长率分别下降了人均64.50美元和5.74美元。在将实施后整个4年期间的影响建模为时间的非线性函数时,PFP降低了医院支出和行政支出的增长,全包协议降低了门诊支出的增长。财务协议可能是促进综合护理和影响医疗保健支出增长的有力工具。结合PFC、PFP和全包支付要素的混合支付方案可能会提供最有力的财务激励措施来控制医疗保健支出增长。