Gasparyan Diana
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia.
Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 2016 Dec;50(4):704-743. doi: 10.1007/s12124-016-9344-8.
There is a problem associated with contemporary studies of philosophy of mind, which focuses on the identification and convergence of human and machine intelligence. This is the problem of machine emulation of sense. In the present study, analysis of this problem is carried out based on concepts from structural and post-structural approaches that have been almost entirely overlooked by contemporary philosophy of mind. If we refer to the basic definitions of "sign" and "meaning" found in structuralism and post-structuralism, we see a fundamental difference between the capabilities of a machine and the human brain engaged in the processing of a sign. This research will exemplify and provide additional evidence to support distinctions between syntactic and semantic aspects of intelligence, an issue widely discussed by adepts of contemporary philosophy of mind. The research will demonstrate that some aspect of a number of ideas proposed in relation to semantics and semiosis in structuralism and post-structuralism are similar to those we find in contemporary analytical studies related to the theory and philosophy of artificial intelligence. The concluding part of the paper offers an interpretation of the problem of formalization of sense, connected to its metaphysical (transcendental) properties.
当代心灵哲学研究存在一个问题，其聚焦于人类与机器智能的识别与趋同。这就是机器对感官的模拟问题。在本研究中，基于结构主义和后结构主义的概念对该问题进行分析，而这些概念几乎被当代心灵哲学完全忽视。如果参考结构主义和后结构主义中“符号”与“意义”的基本定义，我们会看到机器与参与符号处理的人类大脑在能力上存在根本差异。本研究将举例并提供更多证据来支持智能的句法和语义方面的区别，这是当代心灵哲学的行家们广泛讨论的一个问题。该研究将表明，结构主义和后结构主义中与语义学和符号学相关提出的一些观点的某些方面，与我们在当代人工智能理论与哲学相关的分析研究中所发现的相似。论文的结论部分对与意义的形式化问题相关的、与其形而上学（先验）属性的联系进行了解释。
