Brierley Joe, Larcher Victor
Critical Care Unit, Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children, London, UK Paediatric Bioethics Centre, Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children, London, UK.
Paediatric Bioethics Centre, Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children, London, UK.
J Med Ethics. 2016 Aug;42(8):482-5. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2014-102564. Epub 2016 Mar 21.
In 1996, Brazier and Bridge raised the question 'is adolescent autonomy truly dead and buried' following judicial decisions which had seemed to reverse the Gillick-inspired trend for greater child autonomy in healthcare. Subsequent decisions by the courts have reinforced the view that those below 18 years in England and Wales remain children with limited rights to refuse treatment compared with adults. This is at variance with the daily experience of those working with young people who increasingly seek to actively involve them in making freely informed decisions about their healthcare, in accordance with the principles enunciated in the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child and the UK Children Acts. We review the derivation of the law in England and Wales in this area, in the light of another recent family court judgement enforcing treatment on a 'competent' child without his or her consent and ask: 'How can the Common Law and the ethical practice of those caring for young people have diverged so far?' Either young people can decide whether to have a recommended treatment, or they cannot. Given Ian McEwan's book, the Children Act, has stimulated wider social debate in this area might this be an opportune moment to seek public policy resolution with regards to healthcare decision making by young people? We argue that events since the Gillick case have underlined the need for a comprehensive review of legal policy and practice in this area. While absolute autonomy and freedom of choice are arguably inconsistent with the protection rights that society has agreed are owed to children, healthcare practitioners need clarity over the circumstances in which society expects that autonomous choices of adolescents can be overridden.
1996年,布雷齐尔和布里奇在一些司法判决似乎扭转了吉利克案所激发的医疗保健领域儿童自主权扩大的趋势之后,提出了“青少年自主权真的已寿终正寝了吗”这一问题。法院随后做出的判决强化了这样一种观点,即在英格兰和威尔士,18岁以下的人仍然是儿童,与成年人相比,他们拒绝治疗的权利有限。这与从事青少年工作的人的日常经验不符,这些人越来越多地试图让青少年积极参与有关其医疗保健的自主决策,这符合《联合国儿童权利公约》和英国《儿童法案》所阐明的原则。鉴于最近家庭法院又做出了一项未经“有行为能力”的儿童同意就强制其接受治疗的判决,我们审视了英格兰和威尔士这一领域法律的由来,并提出疑问:“普通法与照顾青少年的道德实践怎么会出现如此大的分歧?”要么青少年能够决定是否接受推荐的治疗,要么他们不能。鉴于伊恩·麦克尤恩的小说《儿童法案》引发了该领域更广泛的社会辩论,这是否是寻求关于青少年医疗保健决策的公共政策解决方案的适当时机?我们认为,自吉利克案以来的一系列事件凸显了全面审视该领域法律政策和实践的必要性。虽然绝对的自主权和选择自由可以说与社会认可的儿童应享有的保护权利不一致,但医疗从业者需要明确在哪些情况下社会认为可以推翻青少年的自主选择。