Vogelstein Eric
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
J Med Philos. 2016 Oct;41(5):500-20. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhw019. Epub 2016 Jul 26.
Although advance directives are widely believed to be a key way to safeguard the autonomy of incompetent medical patients, significant questions exist about their moral authority. The main philosophical concern involves cases in which an incompetent patient no longer possesses the desires on which her advance directive was based (e.g., in cases of severe dementia). The question is, does that entail that prior expressions of medical choices are no longer morally binding? I believe that the answer is "yes." I argue that a patient's autonomy is not respected by honoring the desires she used to have but no longer does. I also consider and reject the view that honoring an advance directive that reflects the patient's previous values must be in that patient's best interests. If that is correct, then advance directives in the kind of case at issue are not morally binding.
尽管人们普遍认为预先医疗指示是保障无行为能力患者自主权的关键方式,但关于其道德权威性仍存在重大问题。主要的哲学关切涉及到无行为能力患者不再拥有其预先医疗指示所基于的愿望的情况(例如,在严重痴呆的情况下)。问题在于,这是否意味着先前的医疗选择表达不再具有道德约束力?我认为答案是“肯定的”。我认为,尊重患者曾经有过但现在不再有的愿望并不能尊重患者的自主权。我还考虑并驳斥了这样一种观点,即遵守反映患者先前价值观的预先医疗指示必定符合该患者的最大利益。如果这是正确的,那么在这类有争议的案例中,预先医疗指示就不具有道德约束力。