Andersen Martin Marchman, Nielsen Morten Ebbe Juul
University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, DenmarkUniversity of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, DenmarkUniversity of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark.
J Med Philos. 2016 Oct;41(5):480-99. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhw015. Epub 2016 Jul 29.
What does it take for an individual to be personally responsible for behaviors that lead to increased risk of disease? We examine three approaches to responsibility that cover the most important aspects of the discussion of responsibility and spell out what it takes, according to each of them, to be responsible for behaviors leading to increased risk of disease. We show that only what we call the causal approach can adequately accommodate widely shared intuitions to the effect that certain causal influences-such as genetic make-up or certain social circumstances-diminish, or undermine personal responsibility. However, accepting the causal approach most likely makes personal responsibility impossible. We therefore need either to reject these widely shared intuitions about what counts as responsibility-softening or undermining or to accept that personal responsibility for behaviors leading to increased risk of disease rests on premises so shaky that personal responsibility is probably impossible.
一个人要为导致疾病风险增加的行为承担个人责任需要具备什么条件?我们考察了三种责任认定方法,这些方法涵盖了责任讨论中最重要的方面,并根据每种方法阐明了要为导致疾病风险增加的行为负责需要具备什么条件。我们表明,只有我们所谓的因果关系方法才能充分容纳广泛共有的直觉,即某些因果影响——如基因构成或某些社会环境——会减少或削弱个人责任。然而,接受因果关系方法很可能会使个人责任变得不可能。因此,我们要么拒绝这些关于什么算作责任减轻或削弱的广泛共有的直觉,要么接受这样一种观点,即对导致疾病风险增加的行为承担个人责任所依据的前提是如此不可靠,以至于个人责任很可能是不可能的。