Schwartz W B, Mendelson D N
Department of Medicine, Tufts University School of Medicine, Boston, Mass. 02111.
JAMA. 1989 Sep 8;262(10):1342-6.
This study presents evidence that physician-owned insurance companies and their physician members play an important role in the detection and deterrence of negligent behavior. A survey of physician-owned companies indicates that 94% involve their physicians in one or more aspects of the underwriting process. About 60% involve their members in assessing the competence of physicians who have been sued and in advising the underwriters on decisions concerning both continued insurability and the conditions of insurance. During 1985, a total of 0.66% of the physicians in physician-owned companies had their insurance terminated or were forced to give up their coverage because of negligence-prone behavior. An additional 0.7% of active policyholders were subject to restrictions on practice or other medical sanctions and 1.8% to surcharges and deductibles. Thus, disciplinary actions were in place against 3.2% of insured physicians whose performance was viewed as in some way substandard. The findings indicate that the physician-owned companies are effective agents in identifying negligence-prone behavior, and suggest that these companies also play an important role in deterring substandard performance.
本研究提供了证据,表明医生所有的保险公司及其医生成员在发现和威慑过失行为方面发挥着重要作用。对医生所有的公司进行的一项调查显示,94%的公司让其医生参与承保过程的一个或多个方面。约60%的公司让其成员参与评估被起诉医生的能力,并就有关持续可保性和保险条件的决策向承保人提供建议。1985年期间,医生所有的公司中共有0.66%的医生因易发生过失行为而被终止保险或被迫放弃保险。另外0.7%的有效投保人受到执业限制或其他医疗制裁,1.8%的投保人受到附加费和免赔额的影响。因此,针对3.2%被视为表现存在某种程度不合格的参保医生采取了纪律处分措施。研究结果表明,医生所有的公司是识别易发生过失行为的有效主体,并表明这些公司在威慑不合格表现方面也发挥着重要作用。