Baron Jonathan, Gürçay Burcu, Luce Mary Frances
a Department of Psychology , University of Pennsylvania , Pennsylvania , PA , USA.
b The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University , Durham , NC , USA.
Cogn Emot. 2018 Feb;32(1):116-129. doi: 10.1080/02699931.2017.1295025. Epub 2017 Mar 6.
In four experiments, we asked subjects for judgements about scenarios that pit utilitarian outcomes against deontological moral rules, for example, saving more lives vs. a rule against active killing. We measured trait emotions of anger, disgust, sympathy and empathy (the last two in both specific and general forms, the latter referring to large groups of people), asked about the same emotions after each scenario (state emotions). We found that utilitarian responding to the scenarios, and higher scores on a utilitarianism scale, were correlated negatively with disgust, positively (but weakly and inconsistently) with anger, positively with specific sympathy and state sympathy, and less so with general sympathy or empathy. In a fifth experiment, we asked about anger and sympathy for specific outcomes, and we found that these are consistently predictive of utilitarian responding.
在四项实验中,我们要求受试者对将功利主义结果与道义论道德规则相权衡的情景作出判断,例如,拯救更多生命与反对主动杀人的规则。我们测量了愤怒、厌恶、同情和同理心等特质情绪(后两者有特定形式和一般形式,后者指一大群人),并在每个情景之后询问同样的情绪(状态情绪)。我们发现,对情景的功利主义反应以及功利主义量表上的更高分数,与厌恶呈负相关,与愤怒呈正相关(但较弱且不一致),与特定同情和状态同情呈正相关,与一般同情或同理心的相关性则较弱。在第五项实验中,我们询问了对特定结果的愤怒和同情,我们发现这些情绪始终能预测功利主义反应。