Columbia University, Uris Hall 502, 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027, USA.
Cognition. 2011 Oct;121(1):154-61. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.05.010. Epub 2011 Jul 16.
Researchers have recently argued that utilitarianism is the appropriate framework by which to evaluate moral judgment, and that individuals who endorse non-utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas (involving active vs. passive harm) are committing an error. We report a study in which participants responded to a battery of personality assessments and a set of dilemmas that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. Participants who indicated greater endorsement of utilitarian solutions had higher scores on measures of Psychopathy, machiavellianism, and life meaninglessness. These results question the widely-used methods by which lay moral judgments are evaluated, as these approaches lead to the counterintuitive conclusion that those individuals who are least prone to moral errors also possess a set of psychological characteristics that many would consider prototypically immoral.
研究人员最近提出,功利主义是评估道德判断的适当框架,而那些赞成非功利主义解决道德困境(涉及主动与被动伤害)的人犯了一个错误。我们报告了一项研究,参与者对一系列人格评估和一组困境做出了反应,这些困境使功利主义和非功利主义选项相互对立。那些表示更赞成功利主义解决方案的参与者在心理病态、马基雅维利主义和生活无意义感的测量上得分更高。这些结果对广泛使用的评估常识性道德判断的方法提出了质疑,因为这些方法得出了一个违反直觉的结论,即那些最不容易犯道德错误的人也具有一组许多人认为是典型不道德的心理特征。