School of Psychology,The University of Queensland,St. Lucia,Queensland 4072,
Behav Brain Sci. 2016 Jan;39:e175. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X15002058.
Morsella et al. present a novel theory of consciousness which is more "low-level, circumscribed, counterintuitive, and passive" than previous accounts. There is much to like about this approach. However, what are the explanatory costs associated with these characteristics? In particular, how does this low-level and passive theory accommodate evidence for top-down attention being necessary (but not sufficient) for visual consciousness?
莫斯拉等人提出了一种新的意识理论，与之前的观点相比，这种理论更加“低层次、有限制性、反直觉和被动”。这种方法有很多可取之处。但是，这些特征带来的解释成本是什么？特别是，这种低层次和被动的理论如何解释需要自上而下的注意力才能产生视觉意识（但不是充分条件）这一证据？
