Rogers Wendy A, Walker Mary Jean
Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia.
J Med Philos. 2017 Aug 1;42(4):405-423. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhx010.
Biological dysfunction is regarded, in many accounts, as necessary and perhaps sufficient for disease. But although disease is conceptualized as all-or-nothing, biological functions often differ by degree. A tension is created by attempting to use a continuous variable as the basis for a categorical definition, raising questions about how we are to pinpoint the boundary between health and disease. This is the line-drawing problem. In this paper, we show how the line-drawing problem arises within "dysfunction-requiring" accounts of disease, such as those of Christopher Boorse and Jerome Wakefield. We then provide several detailed examples to establish that biological dysfunction cannot provide a boundary. We examine potential ways of resolving the line-drawing problem, either by dropping one of the claims that generates it, or by appealing to additional criteria. We argue that two of these options are plausible, and that each of these can be applied with regard to different diseases.
在许多观点中,生物功能障碍被视为疾病的必要条件,甚至可能是充分条件。但是,尽管疾病被概念化为非此即彼的状态,生物功能却常常存在程度上的差异。试图将一个连续变量用作分类定义的基础会产生一种张力,引发了关于我们如何确定健康与疾病之间界限的问题。这就是划界问题。在本文中,我们展示了划界问题是如何在诸如克里斯托弗·博尔塞和杰罗姆·韦克菲尔德等人提出的“需要功能障碍”的疾病理论中出现的。然后,我们提供了几个详细的例子来证明生物功能障碍无法提供界限。我们研究了解决划界问题的潜在方法,要么放弃产生该问题的其中一个主张,要么诉诸其他标准。我们认为其中有两个选项是合理的,并且每个选项都可以应用于不同的疾病。