Chao Lin, Elena Santiago F
Section of Ecology, Behavior and Evolution, Division of Biological Sciences, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0116, USA
Instituto de Biología Molecular y Celular de Plantas (IBMCP), Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas-Universidad Politécnica de Valencia, Ingeniero Fausto Elio s/n, 46022 Valencia, Spain.
Proc Biol Sci. 2017 May 17;284(1854). doi: 10.1098/rspb.2017.0228.
The existence of cooperation, or the production of public goods, is an evolutionary problem. Cooperation is not favoured because the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game drives cooperators to extinction. We have re-analysed this problem by using RNA viruses to motivate a model for the evolution of cooperation. Gene products are the public goods and group size is the number of virions co-infecting the same host cell. Our results show that if the trade-off between replication and production of gene products is linear, PD is observed. However, if the trade-off is nonlinear, the viruses evolve into separate lineages of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators as group size is increased. The nonlinearity was justified by the existence of real viral ultra-defectors, known as defective interfering particles, which gain a nonlinear advantage by being smaller. The evolution of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators creates the Snowdrift game, which promotes high-level production of public goods.
合作的存在，或者说公共物品的产生，是一个进化问题。合作并不受青睐，因为囚徒困境（PD）博弈会驱使合作者走向灭绝。我们通过利用RNA病毒来推动一个合作进化模型，重新分析了这个问题。基因产物是公共物品，群体规模是共同感染同一宿主细胞的病毒粒子数量。我们的结果表明，如果复制与基因产物产生之间的权衡是线性的，就会观察到囚徒困境。然而，如果权衡是非线性的，随着群体规模的增加，病毒会进化成超背叛者和超合作者的不同谱系。这种非线性是由真正的病毒超背叛者（即缺陷干扰颗粒）的存在所证明的，它们通过更小的尺寸获得了非线性优势。超背叛者和超合作者的进化创造了雪堆博弈，从而促进了公共物品的高水平产生。
