Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
J Theor Biol. 2010 Oct 7;266(3):358-66. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.042. Epub 2010 Jul 7.
The evolution of cooperation is an enduring conundrum in biology and the social sciences. Two social dilemmas, the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game have emerged as the most promising mathematical metaphors to study cooperation. Spatial structure with limited local interactions has long been identified as a potent promoter of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma but in the spatial snowdrift game, space may actually enhance or inhibit cooperation. Here we investigate and link the microscopic interaction between individuals to the characteristics of the emerging macroscopic patterns generated by the spatial invasion process of cooperators in a world of defectors. In our simulations, individuals are located on a square lattice with Moore neighborhood and update their strategies by probabilistically imitating the strategies of better performing neighbors. Under sufficiently benign conditions, cooperators can survive in both games. After rapid local equilibration, cooperators expand quadratically until global saturation is reached. Under favorable conditions, cooperators expand as a large contiguous cluster in both games with minor differences concerning the shape of embedded defectors. Under less favorable conditions, however, distinct differences arise. In the prisoner's dilemma, cooperators break up into isolated, compact clusters. The compact clustering reduces exploitation and leads to positive assortment, such that cooperators interact more frequently with other cooperators than with defectors. In contrast, in the snowdrift game, cooperators form small, dendritic clusters, which results in negative assortment and cooperators interact more frequently with defectors than with other cooperators. In order to characterize and quantify the emerging spatial patterns, we introduce a measure for the cluster shape and demonstrate that the macroscopic patterns can be used to determine the characteristics of the underlying microscopic interactions.
合作的进化是生物学和社会科学中一个持久的难题。两个社会困境,囚徒困境和雪堆博弈已经成为研究合作最有前途的数学隐喻。具有有限局部相互作用的空间结构长期以来被认为是促进囚徒困境中合作的有力因素,但在空间雪堆博弈中,空间实际上可能增强或抑制合作。在这里,我们研究并将个体之间的微观相互作用与合作者在缺陷者世界中通过空间入侵过程产生的宏观模式的特征联系起来。在我们的模拟中,个体位于具有摩尔邻域的正方形晶格上,并通过概率性地模仿表现更好的邻居的策略来更新他们的策略。在足够有利的条件下,合作者可以在两种游戏中生存。在快速的局部平衡之后,合作者以二次方扩展,直到达到全局饱和。在有利的条件下,合作者在两种游戏中都以大的连续集群扩展,只有关于嵌入缺陷者的形状的细微差异。然而,在不太有利的条件下,会出现明显的差异。在囚徒困境中,合作者会分裂成孤立的、紧凑的集群。密集聚类减少了剥削,导致了正选择,使得合作者与其他合作者的相互作用比与缺陷者的相互作用更频繁。相比之下,在雪堆博弈中,合作者形成小的、树枝状的集群,导致负选择,合作者与缺陷者的相互作用比与其他合作者的相互作用更频繁。为了描述和量化新出现的空间模式,我们引入了一个用于集群形状的度量,并证明宏观模式可用于确定潜在微观相互作用的特征。