Johnstone Rufus A
Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge, CB2 3EJ, United Kingdom.
Evolution. 1998 Dec;52(6):1554-1563. doi: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.1998.tb02236.x.
Recent models of signaling have assumed that the expenditure required to ensure detection of a display is negligible and have concentrated instead on the costs that may be necessary to maintain honesty. Such models predict that individuals who share the same interests are likely to communicate using "conspiratorial whispers," signals that are cheap and inconspicuous. Here, I present a game-theoretical model of signal detection (in a noisy environment, in the presence of potential eavesdroppers), which demonstrates that the idea of conspiratorial whispers is far too simplistic. It is true that in "cooperative" signaling systems (where signalers attempt to elicit responses that are beneficial for receivers), signal cost is not required to maintain honesty. However, some level of expenditure is still needed to ensure that a signal is reliably detected. Moreover, there exists a conflict of interest between signalers and receivers over the division of this expenditure. To predict the stable level of display in such cases, one needs to know how this conflict of interest will be resolved. The model reveals that the outcome may range from a whisper to a conspicuous and costly (though still conspiratorial) display. The more closely related the receiver is to the signaler, the greater the level of signal exaggeration that is expected-the opposite prediction to that of honest signaling models.
近期的信号传递模型假定，确保信号被察觉所需的代价微不足道，因而重点关注维持信号真实性可能所需的成本。此类模型预测，利益相同的个体可能会使用“隐秘低语”进行交流，即成本低廉且不易察觉的信号。在此，我提出一个信号检测的博弈论模型（在存在潜在窃听者的嘈杂环境中），该模型表明隐秘低语的概念过于简单。的确，在“合作性”信号传递系统中（信号发送者试图引发对接收者有益的反应），维持信号真实性无需信号成本。然而，仍需一定程度的投入以确保信号能被可靠察觉。此外，在信号发送者和接收者之间，就这笔投入的分配存在利益冲突。为预测此类情况下信号展示的稳定水平，人们需要知道这种利益冲突将如何解决。该模型表明，结果可能从低语到显著且代价高昂（尽管仍是隐秘的）展示不等。接收者与信号发送者的关系越紧密，预期的信号夸张程度就越高——这与诚实信号传递模型的预测相反。
