Department of Computer Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada.
Auctionomics, Palo Alto, CA 94301.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2017 Jul 11;114(28):7202-7209. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1701997114. Epub 2017 Jun 26.
The recent "incentive auction" of the US Federal Communications Commission was the first auction to reallocate radio frequencies between two different kinds of uses: from broadcast television to wireless Internet access. The design challenge was not just to choose market rules to govern a fixed set of potential trades but also, to determine the broadcasters' property rights, the goods to be exchanged, the quantities to be traded, the computational procedures, and even some of the performance objectives. An essential and unusual challenge was to make the auction simple enough for human participants while still ensuring that the computations would be tractable and capable of delivering nearly efficient outcomes.
最近美国联邦通信委员会(Federal Communications Commission)举行的“激励式拍卖”是首次在两种不同用途之间重新分配无线电频率的拍卖:从广播电视到无线互联网接入。设计挑战不仅在于选择市场规则来管理一系列潜在的交易,还在于确定广播公司的产权、要交换的商品、要交易的数量、计算程序,甚至一些绩效目标。一个至关重要且不同寻常的挑战是,使拍卖足够简单,以便人类参与者参与,同时仍确保计算具有可操作性并且能够提供近乎有效的结果。