University of Lisbon, Portugal.
U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, Vicksburg, MS, USA.
Risk Anal. 2018 Mar;38(3):620-634. doi: 10.1111/risa.12860. Epub 2017 Jul 11.
Shared ownership of property and resources is a longstanding challenge throughout history that has been amplifying with the increasing development of industrial and postindustrial societies. Where governments, project planners, and commercial developers seek to develop new infrastructure, industrial projects, and various other land-and resource-intensive tasks, veto power shared by various local stakeholders can complicate or halt progress. Risk communication has been used as an attempt to address stakeholder concerns in these contexts, but has demonstrated shortcomings. These coordination failures between project planners and stakeholders can be described as a specific kind of social dilemma that we describe as the "tragedy of the anticommons." To overcome such dilemmas, we demonstrate how a two-step process can directly address public mistrust of project planners and public perceptions of limited decision-making authority. This approach is examined via two separate empirical field experiments in Portugal and Tunisia, where public resistance and anticommons problems threatened to derail emerging industrial projects. In both applications, an intervention is undertaken to address initial public resistance to such projects, where specific public stakeholders and project sponsors collectively engaged in a hypothesis-testing process to identify and assess human and environmental health risks associated with proposed industrial facilities. These field experiments indicate that a rigorous attempt to address public mistrust and perceptions of power imbalances and change the pay-off structure of the given dilemma may help overcome such anticommons problems in specific cases, and may potentially generate enthusiasm and support for such projects by local publics moving forward.
财产和资源的共有是一个历史悠久的挑战,随着工业和后工业社会的不断发展,这个问题也在不断加剧。在政府、项目规划者和商业开发商寻求开发新的基础设施、工业项目和各种其他土地和资源密集型任务的过程中,各种当地利益相关者的否决权可能会使进展复杂化或停滞不前。风险沟通一直被用作解决这些情况下利益相关者关切的一种尝试,但已经证明存在不足之处。项目规划者和利益相关者之间的这种协调失败可以被描述为一种特殊的社会困境,我们称之为“共有地悲剧”。为了克服这些困境,我们展示了如何通过两步过程直接解决公众对项目规划者的不信任以及公众对有限决策权的看法。这种方法通过在葡萄牙和突尼斯进行的两个独立的实地实验进行了检验,在这两个国家,公众的抵制和共有地问题威胁到新兴工业项目的推进。在这两个应用中,都采取了干预措施来解决公众对这些项目的最初抵制,具体的公众利益相关者和项目赞助商共同参与了一个假设检验过程,以确定和评估与拟议的工业设施相关的人类和环境健康风险。这些实地实验表明,通过严格的努力来解决公众的不信任和权力失衡的看法,并改变给定困境的收益结构,可能有助于在特定情况下克服这些共有地问题,并可能为当地公众对这些项目产生热情和支持。