Basic Psychology, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain.
Developmental and Educational Psychology, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid, Spain.
J Intellect Disabil Res. 2017 Nov;61(11):1003-1010. doi: 10.1111/jir.12404. Epub 2017 Aug 15.
Individuals with Williams syndrome (WS) show difficulties in attributing false beliefs, whereas they are better at attributing emotions. This study examines whether being asked about the emotion linked to a false belief, instead of explicitly about the belief, facilitates performance on theory of mind (ToM) tasks.
Thirty children with WS and 90 typically developing children, who were individually matched on mental age (50-112 months), were administered six explicit (i.e. questions on belief) and six implicit (i.e. questions on emotion) trials of false belief tasks.
Theory of mind competences were related to cognitive development. Children with WS performed comparably to typically developing children on the emotion questions.
Correct answers to questions on emotion reveal an implicit understanding of false belief. The Representational redescription process could be impaired in the domain of ToM in this population. This finding has relevant implications for the design of supports aiming to optimise the development of ToM competences in individuals with WS.
患有威廉姆斯综合征（WS）的个体在归因虚假信念方面存在困难，而在归因情绪方面则表现较好。本研究探讨了在进行心理理论（ToM）任务时，询问与虚假信念相关的情绪而不是明确询问信念是否能促进表现。
30 名 WS 儿童和 90 名在心理年龄（50-112 个月）上进行个体匹配的典型发育儿童接受了六个显性（即信念问题）和六个隐性（即情绪问题）的虚假信念任务测试。
心理理论能力与认知发展有关。WS 儿童在情绪问题上的表现与典型发育儿童相当。
对情绪问题的正确回答揭示了对虚假信念的隐性理解。在该人群的 ToM 领域，代表性再描述过程可能受损。这一发现对旨在优化 WS 个体 ToM 能力发展的支持设计具有重要意义。
