Jaeger Gregg
Quantum Communication and Measurement Laboratory, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and Division of Natural Science and Mathematics, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
Philos Trans A Math Phys Eng Sci. 2017 Nov 13;375(2106). doi: 10.1098/rsta.2016.0390.
Heisenberg offered an interpretation of the quantum state which made use of a quantitative version of an earlier notion, [Formula: see text], of Aristotle by both referring to it using its Latin name, , and identifying its qualitative aspect with [Formula: see text] The relationship between this use and Aristotle's notion was not made by Heisenberg in full detail, beyond noting their common character: that of signifying the system's objective capacity to be found later to possess a property in actuality. For such actualization, Heisenberg required to have taken place, an interaction with external systems that disrupts the otherwise independent, natural evolution of the quantum system. The notion of state actualization was later taken up by others, including Shimony, in the search for a law-like measurement process. Yet, the relation of quantum potentiality to Aristotle's original notion has been viewed as mainly terminological, even by those who used it thus. Here, I reconsider the relation of Heisenberg's notion to Aristotle's and show that it can be explicated in greater specificity than Heisenberg did. This is accomplished through the careful consideration of the role of potentia in physical causation and explanation, and done in order to provide a fuller understanding of this aspect of Heisenberg's approach to quantum mechanics. Most importantly, it is pointed out that Heisenberg's requirement of an external intervention during measurement that disrupts the otherwise independent, natural evolution of the quantum system is in accord with Aristotle's characterization of spontaneous causation. Thus, the need for a teleological understanding of the actualization of potentia, an often assumed requirement that has left this fundamental notion neglected, is seen to be spurious.This article is part of the themed issue 'Second quantum revolution: foundational questions'.
海森堡对量子态提出了一种解释,该解释运用了亚里士多德早期概念[公式:见正文]的定量版本,既用其拉丁名[公式:见正文]来指代它,又将其定性方面与[公式:见正文]等同起来。除了指出它们的共同特征,即表示系统后来实际具有某种属性的客观能力之外,海森堡并未详细阐述这种用法与亚里士多德概念之间的关系。对于这种实现,海森堡要求发生[公式:见正文],即与外部系统的相互作用,这会扰乱量子系统原本独立的自然演化。态的实现这一概念后来被包括西蒙尼在内的其他人所采用,用于寻找类似定律的测量过程。然而,即使是那些这样使用它的人,量子潜能与亚里士多德原始概念的关系也主要被视为术语上的关系。在这里,我重新审视海森堡的概念与亚里士多德概念之间的关系,并表明它可以比海森堡所做的更具体地阐述。这是通过仔细考虑潜能在物理因果关系和解释中的作用来完成的,目的是更全面地理解海森堡量子力学方法的这一方面。最重要的是,指出海森堡关于测量期间外部干预会扰乱量子系统原本独立的自然演化的要求与亚里士多德对自发因果关系的描述是一致的。因此,对潜能实现进行目的论理解的必要性——这一常常被假定的要求导致这个基本概念被忽视——被认为是虚假的。本文是主题为“第二次量子革命:基础问题”的特刊的一部分。