Anderson Lowell Bruce, Dandurova Helena, Falk James E, Yeganova Lana
Institute for Defense Analyses, 4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22311, USA.
Science Applications International Corporation, Washington, DC 20024, USA.
Soc Choice Welfare. 2009 Mar;32(3):355-365. doi: 10.1007/s00355-008-0327-7. Epub 2008 Aug 14.
There are many situations wherein a group of individuals (e.g., voters, experts, sports writers) must produce an ordered list of 'best' alternatives selected from a given group of alternatives (e.g., candidates, proposals, sports teams). Two long established mechanisms that have been used for this task are 'Zermelo's Ranking Method' (1929) and 'Borda's Voting Scheme' (1781). The main purpose of this paper is to point out that they are, under certain common circumstances, identical. We then show that Zermelo's Method can be used in situations that Borda's Method is not designed to handle.
在许多情况下，一群人（例如选民、专家、体育记者）必须从给定的一组备选方案（例如候选人、提案、运动队）中生成一个“最佳”备选方案的有序列表。长期以来用于此任务的两种机制是“策梅洛排序法”（1929年）和“博尔达投票制”（1781年）。本文的主要目的是指出，在某些常见情况下，它们是相同的。然后我们表明，策梅洛方法可用于博尔达方法无法处理的情况。
