Florida State University, United States.
University of Michigan, United States.
Conscious Cogn. 2018 Aug;63:161-182. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2018.05.006. Epub 2018 May 24.
Research has shown that people ascribe more responsibility to morally bad actions than both morally good and neutral ones, suggesting that people do not attribute responsibility to morally good actions. The present work demonstrates that this is not so: People ascribe more free will to morally good than neutral actions (Studies 1a-1b, Mini Meta). Studies 2a-2b distinguished the underlying motives for ascribing freedom to morally good and bad actions. Free will ascriptions for immoral actions were driven predominantly by affective responses (i.e., punitive desires, moral outrage, and perceived severity of the crime). Free will judgments for morally good actions were similarly driven by affective responses (i.e., reward desires, moral uplift, and perceived generosity), but also more pragmatic considerations (perceived utility of reward, counternormativity of the action, and required willpower). Morally good actions may be more carefully considered, leading to generally weaker, but more contextually sensitive free will judgments.
研究表明，人们将更多的责任归因于道德上的恶行，而不是道德上的善举和中立行为，这表明人们不会将责任归因于道德上的善举。本研究表明并非如此：人们将更多的自由意志归因于道德上的善举，而不是中性行为（研究 1a-1b，小型元分析）。研究 2a-2b 区分了将自由意志归因于道德上的善恶行为的潜在动机。将不道德行为归因于自由意志主要是由情感反应驱动的（即惩罚欲望、道德愤怒和感知到的犯罪严重程度）。对道德上的善举的自由意志判断同样受到情感反应的驱动（即奖励欲望、道德提升和感知到的慷慨），但也受到更务实的考虑（感知到的奖励效用、行为的反规范和所需的意志力）。道德上的善举可能会被更仔细地考虑，从而导致普遍较弱但更具情境敏感性的自由意志判断。
