温度、颜色与大脑：对知识论证的外在主义回应
Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument.
作者信息
Skokowski Paul
机构信息
St Edmund Hall, Oxford University, Queen's Lane, Oxford, OX1 4AR United Kingdom.
出版信息
Rev Philos Psychol. 2018;9(2):287-299. doi: 10.1007/s13164-017-0358-z. Epub 2017 Sep 7.
It is argued that the knowledge argument fails against externalist theories of mind. Enclosing Mary and cutting her off from some properties denies part of the physical world to Mary, which has the consequence of denying her certain kinds of physical knowledge. The externalist formulation of experience is shown to differ in vehicle, content, and causal role from the internalist version addressed by the knowledge argument, and is supported by results from neuroscience. This means that though the knowledge argument has some force against material internalists, it misses the mark entirely against externalist accounts.
有人认为，知识论证对于心灵的外在主义理论是失败的。将玛丽封闭起来并使其与某些属性隔绝，这剥夺了玛丽对物理世界的一部分认知，其结果是剥夺了她某些种类的物理知识。经验的外在主义表述在载体、内容和因果作用方面与知识论证所针对的内在主义版本不同，并且得到了神经科学研究结果的支持。这意味着，尽管知识论证对物质内在主义者有一定的说服力，但它完全没有击中外在主义解释的要害。
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