Department of Health Care Policy, Harvard University, 180 Longwood Ave, Boston, MA 02115, United States.
Department of Health Care Policy, Harvard University, 180 Longwood Ave, Boston, MA 02115, United States.
J Health Econ. 2018 Sep;61:47-62. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.06.010. Epub 2018 Jul 3.
We study how physicians respond to financial incentives imposed by episode-based payment (EBP), which encourages lower spending and improved quality for an entire episode of care. Specifically, we study the impact of the Arkansas Health Care Payment Improvement Initiative, a multi-payer program that requires providers to enter into EBP arrangements for perinatal care, covering the majority of births in the state. Unlike fee-for-service reimbursement, EBP holds physicians responsible for all care within a discrete episode, rewarding physicians for efficient use of their own services and for efficient management of other health care inputs. In a difference-in-differences analysis of commercial claims, we find that perinatal spending in Arkansas decreased by 3.8% overall under EBP, compared to surrounding states. The decrease was driven by reduced spending on non-physician health care inputs, specifically the prices paid for inpatient facility care. We additionally find a limited improvement in quality of care under EBP.
我们研究了医生如何应对基于病例的支付(EBP)所带来的财务激励,EBP 鼓励降低整个医疗护理过程的支出并提高质量。具体来说,我们研究了阿肯色州医疗支付改进计划的影响,该计划是一个多付款人项目,要求提供者为围产期护理签订 EBP 安排,涵盖该州的大多数分娩。与按服务收费的报销不同,EBP 要求医生对特定病例中的所有护理负责,奖励医生高效使用自己的服务和高效管理其他医疗保健投入。在对商业索赔的差异分析中,我们发现,与周边各州相比,阿肯色州的围产期支出在 EBP 下总体下降了 3.8%。这一下降是由非医生医疗保健投入支出减少推动的,特别是住院设施护理的支付价格。我们还发现,EBP 下的医疗质量有一定程度的改善。