Bordon Paola, Fu Chao
The Ministry of Education of Chile.
Rev Econ Stud. 2015 Oct 1;82(4):1247-1288. doi: 10.1093/restud/rdv023. Epub 2015 May 15.
Many countries use college-major-specific admissions policies that require a student to choose a college-major pair jointly. Given the potential of student-major mismatches, we explore the equilibrium effects of postponing student choice of major. We develop a sorting equilibrium model under the college-major-specific admissions regime, allowing for match uncertainty and peer effects. We estimate the model using Chilean data. We introduce the counterfactual regime as a Stackelberg game in which a social planner chooses college-specific admissions policies and students make enrollment decisions, learn about their fits to various majors before choosing one. Our estimates indicate that switching from the baseline to the counterfactual regime leads to a 1% increase in average student welfare and that it is more likely to benefit female, low-income and/or low-ability students.
许多国家采用特定专业的大学录取政策，要求学生同时选择一所大学及其对应的专业。鉴于学生与专业不匹配的可能性，我们探讨推迟学生专业选择的均衡效应。我们在特定专业的大学录取制度下建立了一个排序均衡模型，考虑到匹配不确定性和同伴效应。我们使用智利的数据对该模型进行估计。我们将反事实制度引入为一个斯塔克尔伯格博弈，其中社会规划者选择特定大学的录取政策，学生做出入学决定，在选择专业之前了解自己与各个专业的匹配度。我们的估计表明，从基线制度转向反事实制度会使学生平均福利提高1%，而且更有可能使女性、低收入和/或低能力学生受益。
