Baiasu Sorin
Keele University, Keele, UK.
Philosophia (Ramat Gan). 2017;45(2):397-413. doi: 10.1007/s11406-016-9767-y. Epub 2016 Nov 5.
John Horton's work has been particularly influential in debates on specific topics related to toleration, political obligation, modus vivendi and political realism. More recently, he has synthesised these views in the form of a distinctive position in political philosophy, a position that has the potential to question much of the received wisdom in the field. The papers of this special issue engage with some of the most fundamental issues of Horton's account, more exactly, the related issues of toleration and modus vivendi, Horton's account of associative obligations, with a focus on the methodological assumptions which underpin his position more generally, and the metaphysical presuppositions of his account, in particular, the presupposition of contingency. I offer brief presentations of the papers in the special issue and of the ways they link with each other. In the discussion of the papers by Forst, Newey, Jones, Weale and Mendus, the emphasis will be on those arguments which question Horton's position. Horton's paper will then be presented with a focus on possible responses to these challenges. I will conclude with several remarks on an unexpected continuity between Horton's realist view and a view realists usually criticise as idealising, namely, John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness.
约翰·霍顿的作品在有关宽容、政治义务、权宜之计和政治现实主义等特定主题的辩论中尤其具有影响力。最近,他将这些观点综合成一种独特的政治哲学立场,这种立场有可能对该领域许多公认的智慧提出质疑。本期特刊的论文探讨了霍顿论述中的一些最基本问题,更确切地说,是宽容和权宜之计的相关问题、霍顿对连带义务的论述,重点是更普遍地支撑其立场的方法论假设,以及其论述的形而上学预设,尤其是偶然性的预设。我简要介绍了本期特刊中的论文以及它们相互关联的方式。在对福斯特、纽伊、琼斯、韦尔和门杜斯的论文的讨论中,重点将放在那些质疑霍顿立场的论点上。然后将呈现霍顿的论文,重点是对这些挑战的可能回应。我将以几点看法作为结语,谈谈霍顿的现实主义观点与现实主义者通常批评为理想化的一种观点,即约翰·罗尔斯的公平正义理论之间出人意料的连续性。