1Infection Prevention and Control Unit,Sheba Medical Center,Tel-Hashomer,Israel.
3Microbiology Laboratory,Sheba Medical Center,Tel-Hashomer,Israel.
Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2018 Nov;39(11):1307-1315. doi: 10.1017/ice.2018.235. Epub 2018 Oct 4.
Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) outbreaks are mostly attributed to patient-to-patient transmission via healthcare workers.
We describe successful containment of a prolonged OXA-48-producing S. marcescens outbreak after recognizing the sink traps as the source of transmission.
The Sheba Medical Center intensive care unit (ICU), contains 16 single-bed, semi-closed rooms. Active CPE surveillance includes twice-weekly rectal screening of all patients. A case was defined as a patient detected with OXA-48 CPE >72 hours after admission. A root-cause analysis was used to investigate the outbreak. All samples were inoculated on chrom-agar CRE, and carbapenemase genes were detected using commercial molecular Xpert-Carba-R. Environmental and patient S. marcescens isolates were characterized using PFGE.
From January 2016 to May 2017, 32 OXA-48 CPE cases were detected, and 81% of these were S. marcescens. A single clone was the cause of all but the first 2 cases. The common factor in all cases was the use of relatively large amounts of tap water. The outbreak clone was detected in 2 sink outlets and 16 sink traps. In addition to routine strict infection control measures, measures taken to contain the outbreak included (1) various sink decontamination efforts, which eliminated the bacteria from the sink drains only temporarily and (2) educational intervention that engaged the ICU team and lead to high adherence to 'sink-contamination prevention guidelines.' No additional cases were detected for 12 months.
Despite persistence of the outbreak clones in the environmental reservoir for 1 year, the outbreak was rapidly and successfully contained. Addressing sink traps as hidden reservoirs played a major role in the intervention.
产碳青霉烯酶肠杆菌科(CPE)的爆发主要归因于医护人员导致的患者之间的传播。
我们描述了在认识到水槽陷阱是传播源后,成功控制了长时间产 OXA-48 的黏质沙雷氏菌爆发的情况。
希巴医疗中心重症监护病房(ICU)包含 16 个单人、半封闭的房间。主动的 CPE 监测包括每周两次对所有患者进行直肠筛查。病例定义为入院后 72 小时以上检测到 OXA-48 CPE 的患者。采用根本原因分析来调查疫情。所有样本均接种在 chrom-agar CRE 上,并用商业分子 Xpert-Carba-R 检测碳青霉烯酶基因。使用 PFGE 对环境和患者分离的黏质沙雷氏菌进行特征分析。
从 2016 年 1 月至 2017 年 5 月,检测到 32 例产 OXA-48 CPE 的病例,其中 81%为黏质沙雷氏菌。除了前 2 例之外,其余所有病例都是由单一克隆引起的。所有病例的共同因素是使用了相对大量的自来水。在 2 个水槽出口和 16 个水槽陷阱中检测到了爆发性克隆。除了常规的严格感染控制措施外,为控制疫情还采取了以下措施:(1)各种水槽消毒措施,这些措施只能暂时消除水槽排水处的细菌;(2)教育干预措施,使 ICU 团队参与其中,并高度遵守“水槽污染预防指南”。在 12 个月内未发现其他病例。
尽管疫情爆发的克隆在环境储库中持续了 1 年,但疫情得到了迅速而成功的控制。将水槽陷阱作为隐藏的储库进行处理在干预中发挥了重要作用。