Institute for Health Economics and Policy, Japan.
Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan.
Soc Sci Med. 2018 Nov;216:97-106. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.09.034. Epub 2018 Sep 21.
A shortage of physicians in local public hospitals is often a heated political issue. When local politicians have the authority to intervene in the management of a public hospital, they may increase the employment of physicians during election years in order to alleviate the shortage. We test this hypothesis empirically using a census of city hospitals in Japan from 2002 to 2011 (N = 4583). Our results support the hypothesis that the number of physicians increases in election years. This effect is stronger in cities with a greater population of elderly residents. We also find that physicians tend to come from university hospitals in the same region. Overall, this paper provides direct evidence of political intervention on physician employment.
本地公立医院医生短缺往往是一个热门的政治问题。当地方政客有权干预公立医院的管理时，他们可能会在选举年增加医生的就业人数，以缓解短缺。我们使用 2002 年至 2011 年日本城市医院的普查数据（N=4583）对这一假设进行了实证检验。我们的结果支持这样一种假设，即在选举年医生人数会增加。在老年居民较多的城市，这种效应更为明显。我们还发现，医生往往来自同一地区的大学医院。总的来说，本文提供了政治干预医生就业的直接证据。
