Engelhard Kristina
TU Dortmund, Germany.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2018 Oct;71:24-34. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.06.007. Epub 2018 Jun 26.
One of the central problems of Kant's account of the empirical laws of nature is: What grounds their necessity? In this article I discuss the three most important lines of interpretation and suggest a novel version of one of them. While the first interpretation takes the transcendental principles as the only sources of the empirical laws' necessity, the second interpretation takes the systematicity of the laws to guarantee their necessity. It is shown that both views involve serious problems. The third interpretation, the "causal powers interpretation", locates the source of the laws' necessity in the properties of natural objects. Although the second and third interpretations seem incompatible, I analyse why Kant held both views and I argue that they can be reconciled, because the metaphysical grounding project of the laws' necessity is accounted for by Kant's causal powers account, while his best system account explains our epistemic access to the empirical laws. If, however, causal powers are supposed to fulfil the grounding function for the laws' natural modality, then I suggest that a novel reading of the causal powers interpretation should be formulated along the lines of a genuine dispositionalist conception of the laws of nature.
它们的必然性依据何在？在本文中，我将探讨三种最重要的解释思路，并对其中一种提出一种新颖的版本。第一种解释认为先验原则是经验法则必然性的唯一来源，而第二种解释则认为法则的系统性保证了它们的必然性。结果表明，这两种观点都存在严重问题。第三种解释，即“因果力解释”，将法则必然性的来源定位在自然对象的属性中。尽管第二种和第三种解释似乎不相容，但我分析了康德为何持有这两种观点，并认为它们可以调和，因为法则必然性的形而上学奠基项目由康德的因果力解释来说明，而他的最佳系统解释则说明了我们对经验法则的认知途径。然而，如果因果力被认为要为法则的自然模态履行奠基功能，那么我建议应按照对自然法则的真正倾向主义概念来阐述对因果力解释的一种新颖解读。
