Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2023 Jun;99:97-105. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.04.007. Epub 2022 May 16.
In this paper I extend the case for a necessitation account of particular laws in Kant's philosophy of science by examining the relation between reason's hypothetical use in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and the legitimate hypotheses identified in the Doctrine of Method. Building on normative accounts of reason's ideas, I argue that reason's hypothetical use does not describe the connections between objects and their grounds, which lie beyond the reach of the understanding, but merely prescribes the relations between appearances and their conditions, for which the understanding must seek. A legitimate hypothesis, I suggest, is a proposition we hold to be true that fills in one or several of those relations. The problematic character of hypotheses requires that we evaluate our reasons for holding them to be true. While natural modality is grounded in the nature of things, which cannot be fully known, our reasons for assent can and must be grounded on features of objects that are epistemically available to us.
在本文中，我通过考察《纯粹理性批判》的先验辩证论附录中理性的假设运用与《方法论》中所确定的合法假说之间的关系，扩展了对康德科学哲学中特殊规律的必然性说明的理由。以对理性理念的规范性说明为基础，我认为理性的假设运用并不描述对象与其根据之间的联系，因为这些联系超出了知性的范围，而仅仅规定了表象与其条件之间的关系，知性必须在这些关系中寻找。我认为，合法假说就是我们认为真实的命题，它填补了这些关系中的一个或几个关系。假说的问题特征要求我们评估我们持有的真实理由。虽然自然模态以事物的本质为基础，而事物的本质是无法完全认识的，但我们赞同的理由可以而且必须以我们对认识对象的特征为基础，这些特征是我们认识上可以获得的。
