Operations, Information, and Decisions Department, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104;
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02138.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2018 Nov 6;115(45):11471-11476. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1803212115. Epub 2018 Oct 23.
The development and deployment of matching procedures that incentivize truthful preference reporting is considered one of the major successes of market design research. In this study, we test the degree to which these procedures succeed in eliminating preference misrepresentation. We administered an online experiment to 1,714 medical students immediately after their participation in the medical residency match-a leading field application of strategy-proof market design. When placed in an analogous, incentivized matching task, we find that 23% of participants misrepresent their preferences. We explore the factors that predict preference misrepresentation, including cognitive ability, strategic positioning, overconfidence, expectations, advice, and trust. We discuss the implications of this behavior for the design of allocation mechanisms and the social welfare in markets that use them.
激励真实偏好报告的匹配程序的开发和部署被认为是市场设计研究的主要成功之一。在这项研究中，我们测试了这些程序在消除偏好误报方面的成功程度。我们在医学生参加住院医师匹配后立即对 1714 名医学生进行了在线实验——这是策略证明市场设计的一个主要领域应用。当他们被置于类似的、有激励的匹配任务中时，我们发现 23%的参与者歪曲了他们的偏好。我们探讨了预测偏好误报的因素，包括认知能力、战略定位、过度自信、期望、建议和信任。我们讨论了这种行为对使用它们的分配机制设计和市场社会福利的影响。
