Navigation Research Center, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China.
Sensors (Basel). 2018 Nov 23;18(12):4108. doi: 10.3390/s18124108.
The loosely coupled integration of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and Inertial Navigation System (INS) have been widely used to improve the accuracy, robustness and continuity of navigation services. However, the integration systems possibly affected by spoofing attacks, since integration algorithms without spoofing detection would feed autonomous INSs with incorrect compensations from the spoofed GNSSs. This paper theoretically analyzes and tests the performances of GNSS/INS loosely coupled integration systems with the classical position fusion and position/velocity fusion under typical meaconing (MEAC) and lift-of-aligned (LOA) spoofing attacks. Results show that the compensations of Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) errors significantly increase under spoofing attacks. The compensations refer to the physical features of IMUs and their unreasonable increments likely result from the spoofing-induced inconsistency of INS and GNSS measurements. Specially, under MEAC attacks, the IMU error compensations in both the position-fusion-based system and position/velocity-fusion-based system increase obviously. Under LOA attacks, the unreasonable compensation increments are found from the position/velocity-fusion-based integration system. Then a detection method based on IMU error compensations is tested and the results show that, for the position/velocity-fusion-based integration system, it can detect both MEAC and LOA attacks with high probability using the IMU error compensations.
全球导航卫星系统（GNSS）和惯性导航系统（INS）的松散耦合集成已被广泛用于提高导航服务的精度、鲁棒性和连续性。然而，集成系统可能会受到欺骗攻击的影响，因为没有欺骗检测的集成算法会向自主 INS 提供来自欺骗性 GNSS 的不正确补偿。本文从理论上分析和测试了在典型的欺骗（MEAC）和升轨对齐（LOA）欺骗攻击下，具有经典位置融合和位置/速度融合的 GNSS/INS 松散耦合集成系统的性能。结果表明，在欺骗攻击下，惯性测量单元（IMU）误差的补偿显著增加。补偿是指 IMU 的物理特性，其不合理的增量可能是由 INS 和 GNSS 测量的欺骗诱导不一致引起的。特别是在 MEAC 攻击下，基于位置融合的系统和基于位置/速度融合的系统中的 IMU 误差补偿都明显增加。在 LOA 攻击下，从基于位置/速度融合的集成系统中发现了不合理的补偿增量。然后测试了一种基于 IMU 误差补偿的检测方法，结果表明，对于基于位置/速度融合的集成系统，利用 IMU 误差补偿可以以较高的概率检测到 MEAC 和 LOA 攻击。
