College of Geospatial Information, PLA Strategic Support Force Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450001, China.
State Key Laboratory of Geo-Information Engineering, Xi'an 710054, China.
Sensors (Basel). 2022 Jun 14;22(12):4503. doi: 10.3390/s22124503.
When satellite navigation terminal sensors encounter malicious signal spoofing or interference, if attention is not paid to improving their anti-spoofing ability, the performance of the sensors will be seriously affected. The global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing has gradually become a research hotspot of the jammer because of its great harm and high concealment. In the face of more and more sensors coupling GNSS and inertial measurement unit (IMU) to varying degrees and configuring a variety of anti-spoofing techniques to effectively detect spoofing, even if the spoofer intends to gradually pull the positioning results, if the spoofing strategy is unreasonable, the parameters of the coupled filter output and spoofing observation measurement will lose their rationality, which will lead to the spoofing being detected. To solve the above problems, in order to effectively counter the non-cooperative target sensors of assembling loosely coupled GNSS/IMU using GNSS spoofing, based on the analysis of the influence mechanism of spoofing on the positioning of loosely coupled GNSS/IMU, a slowly varying spoofing algorithm to avoid loosely coupled GNSS/IMU with multiple anti-spoofing techniques is proposed in this paper, and a measurement deviation determination method to avoid multiple anti-spoofing techniques is proposed, which can gradually pull the positioning results of the coupled system and successfully avoid the detection of anti-spoofing techniques of innovation sequence monitoring and a rationality check on parameters. Simulation experimental results show that the proposed algorithm gradually changes the positioning of loosely coupled GNSS/IMU, the north and east displacements achieve the purpose of spoofing, and error with expected offset is -0.2 m and 2.3 m, respectively. Down displacement also basically achieves the purpose of spoofing, and error with the expected offset is 13.2 m. At the same time, the spoofer avoids the detection of multiple anti-spoofing techniques, does not trigger the system alarm, and realizes the purpose of spoofing; thus, the effectiveness and high concealment of the spoofing algorithm are verified.
当卫星导航终端传感器遇到恶意信号欺骗或干扰时，如果不注意提高其抗欺骗能力，传感器的性能将受到严重影响。全球导航卫星系统（GNSS）欺骗由于其危害大、隐蔽性高，逐渐成为干扰机的研究热点。面对越来越多的传感器将 GNSS 和惯性测量单元（IMU）耦合到不同程度，并配置各种抗欺骗技术来有效检测欺骗，即使欺骗者有意逐渐拉偏定位结果，如果欺骗策略不合理，耦合滤波器输出和欺骗观测测量的参数将失去合理性，从而导致欺骗被检测到。为了解决上述问题，针对非合作目标传感器采用 GNSS 欺骗进行松散耦合 GNSS/IMU 装配的问题，在分析欺骗对松散耦合 GNSS/IMU 定位影响机制的基础上，提出了一种避免采用多种抗欺骗技术的缓慢变化欺骗算法，并提出了一种测量偏差确定方法，以避免采用多种抗欺骗技术，可逐渐拉偏耦合系统的定位结果，并成功避免了对创新序列监测的抗欺骗技术和参数合理性检查的检测。仿真实验结果表明，所提出的算法逐渐改变了松散耦合 GNSS/IMU 的定位，北和东的位移达到了欺骗的目的，误差与预期的偏移量分别为-0.2 m 和 2.3 m。下位移也基本达到了欺骗的目的，误差与预期的偏移量为 13.2 m。同时，欺骗者避免了多种抗欺骗技术的检测，不会触发系统报警，从而实现了欺骗的目的；从而验证了欺骗算法的有效性和高隐蔽性。
