Melnick G A, Zwanziger J
UCLA School of Public Health 90024.
JAMA. 1988 Nov 11;260(18):2669-75.
Previous studies of hospital competition have found that greater competition leads to higher hospital costs. We describe herein the change in behavior of California's hospitals since the introduction of competitive and cost-containment programs. To examine the impact of California's pro-competition policies on hospital performance, we grouped the state's short-term hospitals according to the level of competition within their markets. From 1983 through 1985, total inpatient costs (inflation adjusted) increased by less than 1% in hospitals in low-competition markets compared with a decrease of 11.29% in hospitals located in highly competitive markets. After controlling for the effects of the Medicare prospective payment system program, the rate of increase in cost per discharge in hospitals in highly competitive markets was 3.53% lower than the rate of increase in hospitals in low-competition markets during the period from 1983 through 1985. We conclude that these pro-competition policies are having dramatic and potentially far-reaching effects on the nature of hospital competition, leading to increased competition based on price.
以往关于医院竞争的研究发现,竞争加剧会导致医院成本上升。在此,我们描述了自引入竞争和成本控制计划以来加利福尼亚州医院行为的变化。为了研究加利福尼亚州的促进竞争政策对医院绩效的影响,我们根据该州短期医院所在市场的竞争程度对其进行了分组。1983年至1985年期间,低竞争市场医院的住院总费用(经通胀调整)增长不到1%,而高竞争市场医院的住院总费用则下降了11.29%。在控制了医疗保险预期支付系统计划的影响后,1983年至1985年期间,高竞争市场医院的每次出院成本增长率比低竞争市场医院低3.53%。我们得出结论,这些促进竞争的政策正在对医院竞争的性质产生巨大且可能影响深远的影响,导致基于价格的竞争加剧。