1 CAS Key Laboratory of Behavioral Science, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China.
2 Department of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China.
Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2019 Aug;45(8):1308-1320. doi: 10.1177/0146167218823040. Epub 2019 Jan 30.
The question of how we decide that someone else has done something wrong is at the heart of moral psychology. Little work has been done to investigate whether people believe that others' moral judgment differs from their own in moral dilemmas. We conducted four experiments using various measures and diverse samples to demonstrate the discrepancy in moral judgment. We found that (a) people were more deontological when they made moral judgments themselves than when they judged a stranger (Studies 1-4) and (b) a protected values (PVs) account outperformed an emotion account and a construal-level theory account in explaining this discrepancy (Studies 3 and 4). We argued that the discrepancy in moral judgment may serve as a protective mechanism co-evolving alongside the social exchange mechanism and may contribute to better understanding the obstacles preventing people from cooperation.
我们如何认定他人犯错的问题是道德心理学的核心。鲜有研究探讨人们是否认为他人的道德判断在道德困境中与自己的道德判断存在差异。我们通过四项实验，使用各种方法和不同样本，证明了道德判断的差异。我们发现，（a）当人们自己做出道德判断时，他们比判断陌生人时更倾向于道义论（研究 1-4）；（b）保护价值观（PVs）解释优于情绪解释和解释水平理论解释（研究 3 和 4）。我们认为，道德判断的差异可能是一种与社会交换机制共同进化的保护机制，有助于更好地理解阻碍人们合作的障碍。
