University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Oxford, UK.
State University of New York at Oswego, New York, USA.
Bioethics. 2019 Jun;33(5):625-632. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12573. Epub 2019 Mar 13.
Current mainstream approaches to conscientious objection either uphold the standards of public health care by preventing objections or protect the consciences of health-care professionals by accommodating objections. Public justification approaches are a compromise position that accommodate conscientious objections only when objectors can publicly justify the grounds of their objections. Public justification approaches require objectors and assessors to speak a common normative language and to this end it has been suggested that objectors should be required to cast their objection in terms of public reason. We provide critical support for such a public reason condition and argue that it would be neither too demanding nor too permissive. We also respond to objections that it unfairly favours secular over religious objectors and that public reasons cannot be held with the kind of sincerity thought to characterize conscientious objections.
目前主流的良心反对观点要么通过防止反对来维护公共医疗保健的标准，要么通过容纳医疗保健专业人员的良心来保护他们的良心。公共理由方法是一种妥协立场，只有在反对者能够公开证明其反对理由的情况下，才会容纳良心反对。公共理由方法要求反对者和评估者使用共同的规范语言，为此，有人建议反对者应该被要求用公共理性来表达他们的反对意见。我们对这样的公共理性条件提供了批判性的支持，并认为它既不过分苛刻，也不过于宽容。我们还回应了一些反对意见，即它不公平地偏袒世俗反对者而非宗教反对者，以及公共理由不能像被认为是良心反对的那种真诚那样被持有。
