Hugh F. Culverhouse Jr. School of Law, University of Alabama.
Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University.
Stanford Law Rev. 2019 Feb;71(2):341-409.
Based on case studies indicating that apologies from physicians to patients can promote healing, understanding, and dispute resolution, thirty-nine states (and the District of Columbia) have sought to reduce litigation and medical malpractice liability by enacting apology laws. Apology laws facilitate apologies by making them inadmissible as evidence in subsequent malpractice trials. The underlying assumption of these laws is that after receiving an apology, patients will be less likely to pursue malpractice claims and will be more likely to settle claims that are filed. However, once a patient has been made aware that the physician has committed a medical error, the patient’s incentive to pursue a claim may increase even though the apology itself cannot be introduced as evidence. Thus, apology laws could lead to either increases or decreases in overall medical malpractice liability risk. Despite apology laws' status as one of the most widespread tort reforms in the country, there is little evidence that they achieve their goal of reducing litigation. This Article provides critical new evidence on the role of apology laws by examining a dataset of malpractice claims obtained directly from a large national malpractice insurer. This dataset includes substantially more information than is publicly available, and thus presents a unique opportunity to understand the effect of apology laws on the entire litigation landscape in ways that are not possible using only publicly available data. Decomposing medical malpractice liability risk into the frequency of claims and the magnitude of those claims, we examine the malpractice claims against 90% of physicians in the country who practice within a particular specialty over an eight-year period.
基于表明医生向患者道歉可以促进康复、理解和解决争议的案例研究,三十九个州(以及哥伦比亚特区)试图通过制定道歉法来减少诉讼和医疗事故责任。道歉法通过使道歉在随后的医疗事故审判中不可作为证据而促进道歉。这些法律的基本假设是,患者在收到道歉后,不太可能提起医疗事故索赔,而更有可能解决提出的索赔。然而,一旦患者意识到医生犯了医疗错误,即使道歉本身不能作为证据提出,患者寻求索赔的动机可能会增加。因此,道歉法可能会导致医疗事故责任风险的整体增加或减少。尽管道歉法是该国最广泛的侵权改革之一,但几乎没有证据表明它们实现了减少诉讼的目标。本文通过检查从一家大型全国性医疗事故保险公司直接获得的医疗事故索赔数据集,为道歉法的作用提供了重要的新证据。该数据集包含的信息量比公开数据多得多,因此提供了一个独特的机会,以了解道歉法对整个诉讼格局的影响,而仅使用公开数据是不可能做到的。我们将医疗事故责任风险分解为索赔频率和这些索赔的规模,研究了在八年期间针对全国范围内从事特定专业的 90%医生的医疗事故索赔。