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Bioethics. 2019 Jul;33(6):725-728. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12567. Epub 2019 Apr 15.
In a recent article in this journal, Parker Crutchfield argues that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, as some authors claim, then it ought to be covert, i.e., performed without the knowledge of the population that is being morally enhanced. Crutchfield argues that since the aim of compulsory moral bioenhancement is to prevent ultimate harm to the population, compulsory moral bioenhancement is best categorized as a public health issue, and should therefore be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. In this article, I argue for two related claims. First, I question the extent to which compulsory moral enhancement should be considered a public health issue that ought to be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. Second, I argue that Crutchfield's argument that covert moral bioenhancement would better respect people's autonomy than an overt program overlooks two important autonomy-based reasons that, in fact, favor an overt moral enhancement program over a covert one.
在最近的一篇杂志文章中，帕克·克拉奇菲尔德（Parker Crutchfield）认为，如果一些作者声称道德生物增强应该是强制性的，那么它应该是隐蔽的，也就是说，在没有被道德增强的人群知道的情况下进行。克拉奇菲尔德认为，由于强制性道德生物增强的目的是防止对人群造成最终伤害，因此，强制性道德生物增强最好被归类为公共卫生问题，因此应该受到适用于公共卫生环境的规范和价值观的约束。在本文中，我提出了两个相关的主张。首先，我质疑将强制性道德增强视为公共卫生问题并应受到适用于公共卫生环境的规范和价值观约束的程度。其次，我认为，克拉奇菲尔德的论点，即隐蔽的道德生物增强比公开计划更能尊重人们的自主权，忽视了两个重要的基于自主权的理由，实际上，支持公开的道德增强计划而不是隐蔽的道德增强计划。
