Emory University.
Personal Disord. 2019 May;10(3):210-214. doi: 10.1037/per0000318.
In his stimulating commentary, Bornstein (2018) correctly observes that dimensional and categorical approaches have long competed for scientific legitimacy in theory and research on personality disorders. I argue, however, that Bornstein (a) overstates the similarities of these 2 approaches in their implications and (b) risks conflating ontological (the state of the world) with epistemic (how we think about the state of the world) considerations by implying that clinicians' thinking processes should shape how we conceptualize and operationalize personality disorders. Complementing Bornstein's arguments, I contend that some commonplace errors in clinical reasoning may stem from the misapplication of analytic as well as intuitive thinking processes, and that debiasing efforts may need to be supplemented by the implementation of forcing functions in routine clinical practice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
在他那篇发人深省的评论中，Bornstein（2018）正确地指出，在人格障碍的理论和研究中，维度和类别方法长期以来一直在争夺科学合法性。然而，我认为，Bornstein（a）夸大了这两种方法在其含义上的相似性，（b）通过暗示临床医生的思维过程应该影响我们对人格障碍的概念化和操作化，从而将本体论（世界的状态）与认识论（我们如何思考世界的状态）考虑混淆在一起。作为对 Bornstein 观点的补充，我认为，临床推理中的一些常见错误可能源于分析思维和直觉思维过程的不当应用，并且去偏倚的努力可能需要通过在常规临床实践中实施强制功能来加以补充。（PsycINFO 数据库记录（c）2019 APA，保留所有权利）。
