Department of Economics, University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, Germany.
CPNSS, London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom.
PLoS One. 2019 Jul 22;14(7):e0218805. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0218805. eCollection 2019.
The outcomes of bargaining over losses, the subject of this paper, have rarely been studied. But experimental studies of related situations, such as those involving bankruptcies or bequests in which the sum of the legal claims that can be made against a bank or firm or estate are greater than their values, have produced strong support for the proportionality principle. To test whether this principle would find support in other situations involving losses we designed an experimental game in which four players start out with differing initial endowments of real money. They are then informed that a certain amount of this resource has to be given back to the experimenter. How should the loss be shared among the agents? This game was run at different locations and under different treatments over a period of almost three years. We found that the proportionality principle was rarely proposed and even less frequently accepted as a solution to this problem. One of the main reasons for this result was that the two players with the smallest endowments opposed most of the proposals which asked them to contribute at least some positive amount of their own initial resource.
讨价还价损失的结果,是本文的主题,很少被研究。但相关情况的实验研究,如涉及破产或遗赠,其中可以对银行或公司或遗产提出的法律要求的总和大于其价值,为比例原则提供了强有力的支持。为了检验这一原则是否会在其他涉及损失的情况下得到支持,我们设计了一个实验游戏,其中四个参与者最初拥有不同的实际货币禀赋。然后他们被告知必须将一定数量的资源返还给实验者。损失应该如何在代理人之间分担?这个游戏在将近三年的时间里在不同的地点和不同的条件下进行。我们发现,很少有人提出比例原则,甚至很少有人接受这一原则作为解决这一问题的办法。造成这一结果的主要原因之一是,两个禀赋最小的参与者反对大多数要求他们至少贡献自己初始资源一定数额的提议。