Nie Chenwei
a Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick , Coventry , UK.
Cogn Neuropsychiatry. 2019 Jul;24(4):300-307. doi: 10.1080/13546805.2019.1652156. Epub 2019 Aug 4.
Corlett, P. R. (2019. Factor one, familiarity and frontal cortex: A challenge to the two-factor theory of delusions. , (3), 165-177. doi: 10.1080/13546805.2019.1606706 ) raises two groups of challenges against the two-factor theory of delusions: One focuses on weighing "the evidence for … the two-factor theory"; the other aims to question "the logic of the two-factor theory" (ibid., p. 166). McKay, R. (2019. Measles, magic and misidentifications: A defence of the two-factor theory of delusions. , (3), 183-190. doi: 10.1080/13546805.2019.1607273 ) has robustly defended the two-factor theory against the first group. But the second group, which Corlett believes is in many aspects independent of the first group and Darby, R. R. (2019. A network-based response to the two-factor theory of delusion formation. , (3), 178-182. doi: 10.1080/13546805.2019.1606709 , p. 180) takes as "[t]he most important challenge to the two-factor theory raised by Dr. Corlett", has by large remained. Here I offer my two cents in response to the second group. More specifically, I argue that Corlett's challenges to the logic of the two-factor theory, concerning modularity, double dissociation and cognitive penetration, seem to be based on some misunderstandings of the two-factor theory.
科利特，P.R.（2019年。因素一、熟悉度与前额叶皮层：对妄想双因素理论的挑战。，（3），165 - 177。doi:10.1080/13546805.2019.1606706）对妄想双因素理论提出了两组挑战：一组聚焦于权衡“支持……双因素理论的证据”；另一组旨在质疑“双因素理论的逻辑”（同上，第166页）。麦凯，R.（2019年。麻疹、魔法与错误识别：对妄想双因素理论的辩护。，（3），183 - 190。doi:10.1080/13546805.2019.1607273）有力地捍卫了双因素理论以应对第一组挑战。但科利特认为在许多方面与第一组相互独立的第二组挑战，以及达比，R.R.（2019年。对妄想形成双因素理论的基于网络的回应。，（3），178 - 182。doi:10.1080/13546805.2019.1606709，第180页）将其视为“科利特博士对双因素理论提出的最重要挑战”，大体上仍未得到解决。在此，我针对第二组挑战发表一些拙见。更具体地说，我认为科利特对双因素理论逻辑的挑战，涉及模块性、双重解离和认知渗透，似乎基于对双因素理论的一些误解。
