Zheng Yi, Huang Peng, Huang Anqi, Peng Jinye, Zeng Guihua
Opt Express. 2019 Sep 16;27(19):27369-27384. doi: 10.1364/OE.27.027369.
Here, we investigate the security of the practical one-way CVQKD and CV-MDI-QKD systems under laser seeding attack. In particular, Eve can inject a suitable light into the laser diodes of the light source modules in the two kinds of practical CVQKD systems, which results in the increased intensity of the generated optical signal. The parameter estimation under laser seeding attack shows that the secret key rates of these two schemes may be overestimated, which indicates that this attack can open a security loophole for Eve to successfully obtain information about secret key in these practical CVQKD systems. To close this loophole, we propose a real-time monitoring scheme to precisely evaluate the secret key rates of these schemes. The analysis results indicate the implementation of the proposed monitoring scheme can effectively resist this potential attack.
在此，我们研究了实际的单向连续变量量子密钥分发（CVQKD）和连续变量测量设备无关量子密钥分发（CV-MDI-QKD）系统在激光注入攻击下的安全性。具体而言，在这两种实际的CVQKD系统中，伊芙（Eve）可以向光源模块的激光二极管中注入适当的光，这会导致所产生光信号的强度增加。激光注入攻击下的参数估计表明，这两种方案的密钥率可能被高估，这表明这种攻击可能为伊芙在这些实际的CVQKD系统中成功获取有关密钥的信息打开安全漏洞。为了堵住这个漏洞，我们提出了一种实时监测方案，以精确评估这些方案的密钥率。分析结果表明，所提出监测方案的实施可以有效抵御这种潜在攻击。
