Department of Computer Science, Air University Islamabad, Islamabad 44000, Pakistan.
Department of Computer Science & Software Engineering, International Islamic University Islamabad, Islamabad 44000, Pakistan.
Sensors (Basel). 2019 Nov 1;19(21):4752. doi: 10.3390/s19214752.
Despite the many conveniences of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems, the underlying open architecture for communication between the RFID devices may lead to various security threats. Recently, many solutions were proposed to secure RFID systems and many such systems are based on only lightweight primitives, including symmetric encryption, hash functions, and exclusive operation. Many solutions based on only lightweight primitives were proved insecure, whereas, due to resource-constrained nature of RFID devices, the public key-based cryptographic solutions are unenviable for RFID systems. Very recently, Gope and Hwang proposed an authentication protocol for RFID systems based on only lightweight primitives and claimed their protocol can withstand all known attacks. However, as per the analysis in this article, their protocol is infeasible and is vulnerable to collision, denial-of-service (DoS), and stolen verifier attacks. This article then presents an improved realistic and lightweight authentication protocol to ensure protection against known attacks. The security of the proposed protocol is formally analyzed using Burrows Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic and under the attack model of automated security verification tool ProVerif. Moreover, the security features are also well analyzed, although informally. The proposed protocol outperforms the competing protocols in terms of security.
尽管射频识别 (RFID) 系统有许多便利之处,但 RFID 设备之间通信的基础开放式架构可能会导致各种安全威胁。最近,已经提出了许多解决方案来保护 RFID 系统,并且许多这样的系统仅基于轻量级原语,包括对称加密、哈希函数和异或操作。许多仅基于轻量级原语的解决方案被证明是不安全的,而由于 RFID 设备的资源受限性质,基于公钥的密码解决方案对于 RFID 系统来说是不可行的。最近,Gope 和 Hwang 提出了一种基于轻量级原语的 RFID 系统认证协议,并声称他们的协议可以抵御所有已知的攻击。然而,根据本文的分析,他们的协议是不可行的,容易受到碰撞、拒绝服务 (DoS) 和窃取验证器攻击。本文随后提出了一种改进的现实和轻量级认证协议,以确保抵御已知攻击。使用 Burrows Abadi-Needham (BAN) 逻辑和自动化安全验证工具 ProVerif 的攻击模型对所提出的协议进行了正式分析。此外,虽然是非正式的,但也对安全功能进行了很好的分析。在所提出的协议中,在安全性方面优于竞争协议。