Townsend Leo Charles
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria.
Philos Explor. 2019 Jul 15;22(3):243-258. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2019.1641613. eCollection 2019.
I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated "epistemic temptations". The first way is through the avowal of belief, and the second is through the establishment of collective belief. I argue that both of these forms of interpersonal epistemic commitment can function as effective tools for doxastic self-control, and, moreover, that the control they facilitate should not be dismissed as irrational from an epistemic perspective.
我探讨了信念自我控制的人际机制的可能性与合理性，即个体能够利用他人来使自己坚守信念的方式。我特别考察了人们做出人际认知承诺的两种方式，从而自愿对他人负责，以便在面对预期的“认知诱惑”时仍能坚守自己的信念。第一种方式是通过信念的公开宣称，第二种方式是通过集体信念的建立。我认为，这两种人际认知承诺形式都可以作为信念自我控制的有效工具，而且，从认知角度来看，它们所促成的控制不应被视为不合理而不予理会。
