de Vries Bouke
Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden.
Med Health Care Philos. 2020 Mar;23(1):17-24. doi: 10.1007/s11019-019-09931-5.
It is commonly assumed that many, if not most, adult children have moral duties to visit their parents when they can do so at reasonable cost. However, whether such duties persist when the parents lose the ability to recognise their children, usually due to dementia, is more controversial. Over 40% of respondents in a public survey from the British Alzheimer's Society said that it was "pointless" to keep up contact at this stage. Insofar as one cannot be morally required to do pointless things, this would suggest that children are relieved of any duties to visit their parents. In what appears to be the only scholarly treatment of this issue, Claudia Mills has defended this view, arguing that our duties to visit our parents require a type of relationship that is lost when parents no longer remember who their children are. This article challenges Mills' argument. Not only can children be duty-bound to visit parents who have lost the ability to recognise them, I argue that many children do in fact have such duties. As I show, these duties are grounded in any special interests that their parents have in their company; the fact that visiting their parents might allow them to comply with generic duties of sociability; and/or the fact that such visits allow them to express any gratitude that they owe their parents.
人们通常认为,即便不是大多数,许多成年子女在力所能及且成本合理的情况下,都负有看望父母的道德义务。然而,当父母通常因痴呆症而丧失识别子女的能力时,这种义务是否依然存在,就更具争议性了。英国阿尔茨海默病协会的一项公众调查显示,超过40%的受访者表示,在这个阶段保持联系是“毫无意义的”。既然道德上不能要求一个人去做毫无意义的事情,这就意味着子女不再负有看望父母的任何义务。在似乎是对这个问题唯一的学术探讨中,克劳迪娅·米尔斯为这一观点进行了辩护,她认为我们看望父母的义务需要一种特定的关系,而当父母不再记得自己的孩子是谁时,这种关系就不复存在了。本文对米尔斯的论点提出了质疑。我认为,子女不仅可能有义务看望丧失识别能力的父母,而且事实上许多子女确实负有这样的义务。正如我所表明的,这些义务基于父母对子女陪伴的特殊兴趣;看望父母可能使子女履行社交的一般义务;以及/或者这样的看望能让子女表达对父母应有的感激之情。