Philosophy and Religion, Central College, Pella, IA 50219, USA
J Med Ethics. 2020 Apr;46(4):275-276. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2019-105908. Epub 2019 Dec 13.
In 'Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis', I argued that Marquis' argument about abortion encounters the Epicurean Challenge. In this essay, I continue the conversation begun there. I aim to motivate the Challenge further by examining Marquis' argument on his own terms and responding to objections about whom death deprives, whether we should focus on the action of killing or the result of death, and how harms suffered before existence compare to harms suffered after death. Finally, I suggest that perhaps the solution to the ethics of killing lies in considering another account of harm entirely-one that does not rely on deprivation.
在《堕胎与剥夺：对马库斯的回应》一文中，我认为马库斯关于堕胎的论点遭遇了伊壁鸠鲁的挑战。在这篇文章中，我继续在那里开始的对话。我旨在通过根据马库斯自己的论点进一步激发挑战，并回应关于谁被剥夺了生命、我们是否应该关注杀戮行为还是死亡结果，以及生前遭受的伤害与死后遭受的伤害相比如何等问题，来进一步推动挑战。最后，我认为解决杀戮伦理的方法可能在于完全考虑另一种伤害概念——一种不依赖于剥夺的概念。
