University of Trento, Italy.
Korean Institute for Public Administration, Seoul, South Korea.
Risk Anal. 2020 May;40(5):1001-1019. doi: 10.1111/risa.13454. Epub 2020 Feb 22.
We study interdependent risks in security, and shed light on the economic and policy implications of increasing security interdependence in presence of reactive attackers. We investigate the impact of potential public policy arrangements on the security of a group of interdependent organizations, namely, airports. Focusing on security expenditures and costs to society, as assessed by a social planner, to individual airports and to attackers, we first develop a game-theoretic framework, and derive explicit Nash equilibrium and socially optimal solutions in the airports network. We then conduct numerical experiments mirroring real-world cyber scenarios, to assess how a change in interdependence impact the airports' security expenditures, the overall expected costs to society, and the fairness of security financing. Our study provides insights on the economic and policy implications for the United States, Europe, and Asia.
我们研究安全方面的相互依存风险，并在存在反应式攻击者的情况下，阐明安全相互依存度增加带来的经济和政策影响。我们调查了潜在的公共政策安排对一组相互依存的组织（即机场）安全的影响。我们专注于安全支出和社会评估的成本，由社会规划者来评估个别机场和攻击者，首先我们开发了一个博弈论框架，并推导出机场网络中的明确纳什均衡和社会最优解。然后，我们进行了模拟现实网络场景的数值实验，以评估相互依存关系的变化如何影响机场的安全支出、社会的总成本以及安全融资的公平性。我们的研究为美国、欧洲和亚洲提供了有关经济和政策影响的见解。
