Kennedy Inst Ethics J. 2020;30(1):71-109. doi: 10.1353/ken.2020.0001.
Medical professionals routinely offer prenatal genetic testing services to their expecting patients. Some bioethicists believe that when these professionals promote the use of such testing for abortion on grounds of disability, they express a devaluing message to and about extant disabled people. Supporters of this expressivist objection further maintain that, in expressing such a message, medical professionals reinforce negative attitudes about extant disabled people and thereby further stigmatize them. But while the expressivist objection has received quite a bit of support from disability rights theorists-in part because of its intuitive appeal-its current formulation suffers from various shortcomings that render it implausible. By invoking tools from the philosophy of language, I present the expressivist objection*: an improved and distinctive formulation of the expressivist objection that preserves some of its core insights. According to this improved formulation, the promotion of prenatal testing for selective abortion can at least sometimes be wrong.
医疗专业人员通常会向他们的预期患者提供产前基因检测服务。一些生物伦理学家认为，当这些专业人员出于残疾原因提倡使用这种检测进行堕胎时，他们向现存的残疾人士表达了一种贬低的信息。这种表现主义反对意见的支持者进一步认为，医疗专业人员在表达这种信息时，强化了对现存残疾人士的负面态度，从而进一步污名化他们。但是，尽管表现主义反对意见得到了残疾权利理论家的相当多支持——部分原因是其直观的吸引力——但其当前的表述存在各种缺陷，使其难以令人信服。通过援引语言哲学的工具，我提出了表现主义反对意见：对表现主义反对意见的一种改进和独特的表述形式，保留了其一些核心观点。根据这个改进的表述，至少有时，提倡选择性堕胎的产前检测可能是错误的。
