Field Epidemiology, Field Service, National Infection Service, Public Health England, Nottingham, UK.
Field Epidemiology, Field Service, National Infection Service, Public Health England, Nottingham, UK.
J Hosp Infect. 2020 May;105(1):70-77. doi: 10.1016/j.jhin.2019.12.004.
In 2014, two residents of a long-term care facility (LTCF) developed invasive group A streptococcal (iGAS) infections with identical typing (emm 11), resulting in one death. The second resident recovered but had a subsequent episode of emm 11 iGAS infection 10 months later. This second episode was linked to a third case, within 12 days, leading to a further outbreak investigation.
To combine different techniques to establish whether this was a protracted outbreak, understand transmission pathways and inform appropriate control measures.
Following a routine response to the first cluster, the second investigation included a care record review. This informed network analysis of case interactions with staff and visitors during 10 days prior to infection. These data were combined with post-outbreak whole-genome sequencing (WGS) using isolates from cases, and staff and resident screening (44 GAS isolates: 11 outbreak-related and 33 sporadic isolates).
Two of the three confirmed iGAS cases died (one suffered two episodes). All iGAS cases, and six non-invasive isolates from 2015, were emm 11 (monophylogenetic WGS clade). Network analysis highlighted only indirect contact through staff-visitor interactions between iGAS cases in 2015. This suggested a common source and transmission propagation through carriage and/or environmental contamination over an 11-month period.
This outbreak highlighted benefits of staff/resident screening and typing as part of routine response. Network analysis and highly discriminatory WGS clarified the protracted nature of the outbreak, supporting findings of hygiene and infection control issues and adding to our understanding of the epidemiology.
2014 年,一家长期护理机构(LTCF)的两名居民发生了侵袭性 A 组链球菌(iGAS)感染,具有相同的分型(emm11),导致 1 人死亡。第二名居民康复,但 10 个月后又发生了一次 emm11 iGAS 感染。这第二起事件与 12 天内的第三例病例有关,导致了进一步的爆发调查。
结合不同技术,确定这是否是一次长期爆发,了解传播途径并提供适当的控制措施。
在对第一起集群进行常规响应后,第二次调查包括对护理记录的审查。这为在感染前 10 天内病例与工作人员和访客的互动进行网络分析提供了信息。这些数据与爆发后的全基因组测序(WGS)相结合,使用病例、工作人员和居民的分离物(44 个 GAS 分离物:11 个爆发相关和 33 个散发性分离物)。
3 例确诊的 iGAS 病例中有 2 例死亡(1 例发生了两次)。所有 iGAS 病例,以及 2015 年的 6 个非侵袭性分离物,均为 emm11(单系统发育 WGS 分支)。网络分析仅突出了 2015 年 iGAS 病例之间通过工作人员-访客相互作用的间接接触。这表明在 11 个月的时间里,存在共同的传染源和通过携带和/或环境污染传播的情况。
该爆发突显了工作人员/居民筛查和分型作为常规应对措施的一部分的好处。网络分析和高度区分的 WGS 阐明了爆发的长期性,支持了卫生和感染控制问题的发现,并增加了我们对流行病学的理解。